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INTRODUCTION

"Compliance" is one of the central concepts in current and proposed
research projects using social science methods to study the effects and
significance of international law. Discussion of compliance often
proceeds as if the concept of "compliance" is largely shared; that is, as
if there was a shared understanding that compliance is adequately
defined as conformity of behavior with legal rules, and the real
* Visiting Professor, New York University Law School; Professor of Law, Duke University Law School. D. Phil., Oxford (1990); M. Phil., Oxford (1984);. LL.B., Canterbury
(1981). This is a revised version of a paper prepared for the May 1996 American Society of
International Law Workshop on Global Change and Compliance with Non-Binding Legal
Accords; the workshop was convened to discuss the research design for an empirical project
on that topic. Many thanks to several participants in the workshop and to Donald Horowitz
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problems are about such matters as measuring, monitoring and
improving compliance, and the simultaneous optimization of levels of
compliance and rigor of the relevant standards. This article makes the
contrary argument that the concept of "compliance" with law does not
have, and cannot have, any meaning except as a function of prior
theories of the nature and operation of the law to which it pertains.
"Compliance" is thus not a free-standing concept, but derives meaning
and utility from theories, so that different theories lead to significantly
different notions of what is meant by "compliance." Thus as a research
concept, "compliance" cannot stand on its own, but must depend on a
stipulated or shared theory of law.
In the case of international law, the elements of the concept of law
which must be specified to give meaning to the concept of "compliance"
are deeply contested. There is also likely to be considerable variance in
concepts of national law that are relevant to "compliance" with international law. Concepts of "compliance" depend upon understandings of
the relations of law, behavior, objectives, and justice. These relations are
of central importance to the real-world problems with which international lawyers are habitually concerned, and must be theorized before
there can be any true theory of "compliance."
The purpose of this article is to challenge the tendency in the existing
literature to view "compliance" simply as "correspondence of behavior
with legal rules." This tendency is intelligibly based in a theoretical view
that law can properly be defined and understood as a body of rules and
expresses a practical concern to get on with the important task of producing empirical studies of compliance. The logical corollary is that a
reasonable degree of conformity between these rules and actual behavior is necessary to an efficacious legal system, so that recurrent and
widespread non-conformity with rules would usually call into question
the existence of law.
Given these theoretical premises, the first empirical task is to determine whether, as is often asserted by international lawyers, most
States and other subjects of international law conform to most legal
rules most of the time.' We have impressions which may rise to the level
of "anecdata," but in many areas we simply do not have systematic
studies to show whether or not most States conform to most international law rules most of the time,2 and the studies we do have show that
1. See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979).
2. Stephen Schwebel rightly pointed out in 1981 that international lawyers have had
too little to say about fundamentals of compliance beyond anecdotes and broad impressions.
See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Compliance Process and the Future of InternationalLaw, 75
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 178-85 (1981). In 1994
Schwebel observed that, "[clompliance is a problem which lawyers tend to avoid rather than
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impressions based on "anecdata" are not necessarily reliable. While raw
data is increasingly available on responses by States to some types of
international decisions, especially where a monitoring or supervisory
body exists or where the decisions confer particular benefits on other
actors who perform monitoring functions,3 the dearth of good empirical
studies of correspondence between state behavior and international legal
rules and decisions is a serious obstacle to adequate understanding and
evaluation of the international legal system. Likewise, systematic work
on results of different modalities of pursuing correspondence of behavior to international rules is patchy, although domestic compliance
studies have demonstrated the practical importance for policy goals, and
the unanticipated consequences, of different modalities. The 'muchneeded empirical work on compliance is beginning to appear in increasing quantity, involving case studies, large-n series, and other
methodologies. Yet, as those engaged in this work readily acknowledge,
the methodological obstacles to this inquiry are severe
Characterization in marginal cases is rendered difficult by the problems international lawyers address daily, including differences of
opinion as to interpretation, uncertainty as to the authority of different
sources of law, issues of opposability, and excuses precluding responsibility. Recent studies of environmental and human rights norms show
checkered patterns of conformity and non-conformity with rules, and
highlight the differences between conduct prescribed by rules and the

confront." S.M. Schwebel, Comment, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
COURTS 39, 39 (M.K. Bulterman and M. Kuijer eds., 1996).
3. Several scholars have addressed the establishment by the United Nations Human
Rights Committee of a follow-up procedure to monitor implementation of Final Views issued

under the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
See Markus Schmidt, Portie et suivi des constatationsdu Comiti des Droits de I'Homme des
Nations Unies, in LA PROTECTION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME PAR LE COMrrT DES DROrrS DE
L'HOMME DES NATIONS UNIES: LES COMMUNICATIONS INDIVIDUELLES 157 (Actes du Collo-

que de Montpellier, 1995); see also U.N. Doc. A/51/40, vol. 1 (1996) (discussing follow-up
procedures in the 1996 Report of the Human Rights Committee). See generally DONNA
GOMIEN, JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1959-95 (1996)
(collecting data on action taken by States in response to adverse decisions); JORG POLAKIEWICZ, DIE VERPFLICHTUNGEN DER STAATEN AUS DEN URTEILEN DES EUROPAISCHEN

GERICHTSHOFS FOR MENSCHENRECHTE (1993) (explaining legal aspects of the supervisory
system of the European Convention on Human Rights). An illustrative case of bilateral

monitoring, accompanied by a variety of enforcement mechanisms, is the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal. Supervision of European Court of Justice decisions implicates a complex range of
issues. See generally J.A. Usher, Court of Justice of the European Communities, in
COMPLIANCE

WITH JUDGMENTS

OF INTERNATIONAL

COURTS,

supra note

2,

at

87

(overviewing complex range of issues concerning supervision of European Court of Justice
decisions).
4. See, e.g., Susan Subak, Verifying Compliance with an UnmonitorableClimate Convention, 9 INT'L ENvTL. AFF. 148 (1997).
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actual conduct and long-term policies necessary to meet the underlying
objectives of the particular international regime and other important
policy goals. These and other studies show that the assumption that conformity and non-conformity are binary is not an adequate reflection, of
international practice, in which degrees of conformity or nonconformity and the circumstances of particular behavior often seem
more important to the participants
But even if we knew how far state behavior conformed with international norms, we would not necessarily have an account of the causal
relations of law and behavior, nor would we be much further forward in
evaluating legal rules against propositions about justice. Although empirical work is vital, it must depend for its meaning and implications on
further development of the theory of international law compliance. Defense of a particular theoretical approach would be too ambitious in this
short article. The modest aim here is to sketch a sufficient variety of
competing concepts of law, with their divergent implications for notions
of "compliance," to establish that much is lost by treating the basic concept of "compliance" as unproblematic, and to show that choosing and
deploying a theory (or interlocking theories) of law is essential to articulating and defending a concept of "compliance."
I. CONCEPTS OF LAW RELEVANT TO COMPLIANCE:

SOME BASIC DISTINCTIONS

Any attempt to typologize theories of law in a manner useful for the
purposes of this article is liable to be reductionist and to involve caricature. Four broad sets of approaches to international law will be
surveyed, not on the basis of any systematic categorization, but with
reference to three simplified distinctions that bear directly on research
relating to compliance. These three distinctions are not categorical: they
provide a rough first cut, sufficient for the limited purposes of this article but not for rigorous taxonomy.
A. Rule-Based v. Process-BasedTheories
First, the centrality and significance of legal rules varies across the
range of theories considered here. Traditional positivist theories of law
are rule-based: the enterprise is to separate law from non-law, whether
through source-based accounts of legal rules as commands, or social
fact theories of legal rules as elements of a legal system consisting of
5. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 17-23 (1995).
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primary and secondary rules.6 These positivist accounts of law and legal
institutions have been influential among positivist social scientists
seeking to evaluate the significance of international law. Whereas positivist legal theories have often emphasized sources, however, social
scientists interested in explaining the relation of rules to behavior often
identify rules by the presence or absence of objectively discernible patterns of regular behavior, including sanctioning behavior. In contrast to
rule-based views of law stand process-based views, including the New
Haven view of law as a process of authoritative and controlling decision, and current projects to develop a theory of compliance based on
transnational legal process.' Regulatory theories focusing on the close
interactions of regulators and those they regulate also incorporate rules
as one element in a wider process, and generate different practical understandings of compliance.
B. Rational-Actorv. OtherApproaches to Behavior
Second, theories of law vary as to reliance on models built on assumptions of instrumentally rational actor behavior. Purely economic
theories of law make standard economic assumptions that actors have
well-defined, complete, and transitive subjective preferences over the
relevant alternatives, that actors have the analytic capacity and disposition to choose the best feasible alternative given the available
information, and that actors will follow game-theoretic behavior patterns in strategic situations (i.e., where the preferences and conduct of
others are relevant to the decision).9 But many critics deny both that the
relevant behavior of each actor can be modeled simply in terms of instrumentally rational maximization of preferences, and that the standard
economic accounts of the influence of law on behavior adequately capture the operation of law as a normative system among moral agents. As
Ayres and Braithwaite rightly note:
6. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart
ed., 1954); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
7. See generally HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE
FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (1992) (presenting an account

of law as a social and political process).
8. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106
YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVERIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995);
THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995))

(discussing the perennial debates between realists and liberal internationalists); Harold
Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
9. See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, The New Economic Analysis of Law: Legal
Rules as Incentives, in LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989) (elaborating

an economic theory of how individuals behave in response to legal rules).
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Much of contemporary social science is a stalemate between
theories assuming economic rationality on the part of actors and
theories counterposing action as variously motivated by a desire
to comply with norms, to maintain a sense of identity, to do
good or simply to act out a habituated behavioral sequence.10
Social scientists are divided on similar issues.
C. Directive v. Non-Directive Theories
Third, most theories of law are directive, in the sense that the legal
system as a whole is oriented toward particular goals or objectives.
Lawmakers (or society) have deliberate intentions as to the goals of the
relevant society (in this case, international society), even if they differ as
to what these goals are and as to how best to implement them through
law. Individual actors also have particularistic motives, but the overall
goal is kept in view. Natural law theories, and Ronald Dworkin's theory
of law as integrity, are directive theories." Non-directive theories, in
contrast, presume that no goals of the legal system as a whole may usefully be identified, even though individual actors may act purposively.
Public choice theories are a prominent example of non-directive accounts: the assumption of most law and economics theories that individual
law-taking actors are self-interested is extended to the lawmakers, and
indeed the role-differentiation between these two classes is expected to
erode where special interests are well organized. 2

II. DIRECTIVE AccouNTs OF LAW AS RULES FOR
INSTRUMENTALLY RATIONAL ACTORS
A. Realist Theories of InternationalRelations:
Law as Epiphenomenon
The standard realist model of international relations posits that
States as unitary actors rationally pursuing their own interests as best
they can, given their capacities and the constraints imposed by the
power and interests of others. Law may be a useful means to maintain
the stability of the system (e.g., diplomatic immunity) and to solve some
coordination problems (e.g., international civil aviation arrangements)
where an agreed-upon rule becomes a focal point for behavior and is
10. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 51 (1992).

11. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986).

12. See Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 29-30.
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virtually self-enforcing. Law may also be used by hegemonies to
establish and enforce standards to which weaker States are obliged to
conform. But compliance for realists is little more than a calculation of
interests in light of the existing distribution of power. Transaction costs
and the value of stability are both sufficiently high that States may
behave habitually without continuous recalculation of interests, but if a
legal commitment is inconsistent with a significant interest of a State
and it has the power to act in a manner which better serves its interest, it
will usually do so. There is no categorical difference in function
between "binding" and "non-binding" international rules, although there
may be differences where domestic legal systems are involved, and the
discourse of justification and violation may be inconsequentially
different.
Realist positions undergird apologetic explanations of conformity of
behavior with international legal rules based on the alleged correspondence between the rules and the interests of States. This correspondence
itself is explained by the proposition that States make the law and thus
are likely only to make rules they can live with, and to have a greater
interest in honoring and upholding inconvenient commitments because
of the general benefit to States of the continued effectiveness of the international legal system. But with rare exceptions, international lawyers
also adopt the implicit position that the legal rule itself provides a very
strong reason for rule-consistent behavior.'" This position derives from a
commitment to the normativity of law, but advocacy of this position has
long been seen as "utopian," leading to justifications in which positions
characterized as realist and utopian coexist without resolution.
B. RationalistTheories of Inter-State Cooperation:
Law as a Functional Phenomenon
Extending and eventually challenging realism, rationalist theories
have traditionally used game theory to model cooperation among States
as unitary actors. 15 States are instrumentally rational egoistic interestmaximizers, but they are observed to cooperate in circumstances not
13. Cf. GUY DE LACHARRItRE, LA POLITIQUE JURIDIQUE EXTIRIEURE (1983) (arguing
that international relations are based not so much on laws as on military, economic, and cultural factors).
14. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989).

15. Increasing attention is being given to more complex connections between different
games. One common approach is to connect international and domestic politics through
"two-level" games. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Integrating International and Domestic
Theories of International Bargaining, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 3, 15-17 (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993).
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predicted by realism (although the extent of this cooperation is a hotly
contested topic). Some of this cooperation involves conforming behavior to norms, including legal rules, especially in international
institutional settings. The effect of legal rules on behavior, like the effect
of institutions, is analyzed in functional terms. Rules and institutions
help stabilize expectations, reduce transaction costs of bargaining, raise
the price of defection by lengthening the shadow of the future, increase
the availability of information, provide or facilitate monitoring, settle
disputes, increase audience costs of commitments, connect performance
across different issues, and increase reputational costs and benefits related to conformity of behavior with rules.
Under this theory of cooperation, rational pursuit of interests is the
principal explanation of behavior, but norms (including legal rules) alter
the costs and incentives in the calculations of rational actors. Rules shape
opportunities. In economic terms, they function like prices in a market.
Compliance is thus likely to be understood as a matter of consistency of
behavior with the rule as interpreted by its authoritative interpreters. Noncompliance is behavior inconsistent with the rule as so interpreted, and is
synonymous (at least in the standard case of "binding" rules) with violation. Non-compliance is likely to be met by reciprocal responses and may
attract third party sanctions. The evidence of the infrequency of severe
sanctions, and of the apparent effectiveness of non-sanction elements of
international institutions, leads to the argument that "sanctions or even
threats to impose sanctions seldom constitute the most important determinant of observed levels of compliance with institutionalized rights and
rules."' 6 Chayes and Chayes reject as unrealistic such an enforcement
model of compliance, favoring a cooperative, problem-solving "managerial"
model of compliance.' 7 This does not answer the concern that whatever
success may be attributed to the managerial approach, in the absence of
effective enforcement, States are unlikely to adopt or obey agreements
requiring them to bear greater costs for the common good.'8
In the rationalist view, decisions as to whether to comply are costbenefit calculations that depend on the discount rate for future time
periods. Apart from sanctions, the impact of legal rules on cost-benefit
calculations is often condensed into issues of reputation for complying
with commitments. But a reputation as law-abiding may be valued less
than a reputation for unflinching protection of vital interests, just as a
16.

ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT

INA STATELESS SOCIETY 195 (1994).
17. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5.

18. George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about
Cooperation?,50 INT'L ORG. 379, 379-80 (1996).
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reputation for occasional irrational rage or stubbornness may be of
greater value to a market actor than a reputation for pure rationality.
Rules and institutions have the further effect over time of shaping
actor preferences: that is, preferences are treated as endogenous rather
than exogenous. Thus, the effect of coerced implementation in a developing country of an international law rule requiring U.S.-style
intellectual property protection might be to spur growth in the number
and influence of local beneficiaries of such property protection to such
an extent as to shift the preferences of that State toward an intellectual
property rights regime. Rules and institutions may similarly alter actors' beliefs; for example, a rule requiring reporting of pollution data
may ultimately lead States to shift their beliefs about the causes of
particular environmental degradation. 9 Where such future shifts in
interests or beliefs are predictable results of present decisions, rationalist theorists are able (albeit with difficulty) to model the relevant
present decisions in rational-actor terms.
The challenge, as rationalist instrumentalist theorists see it, is posed
by the unintended consequences (for future interests and beliefs) of present decisions to adopt a particular rule or, more commonly, to enter
into an institution or regime with rule-making or sanctioning powers.
Thus, Norway's decision to enter the Economic Commission for Europe
(ECE) Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) regime may
be seen .as a rational pursuit of Norway's interest in reducing acid rain
through a strong regime capable of mobilizing opposition to acid rain
and developing tough new rules and monitoring mechanisms. However,
the former USSR's decision to join the same regime may have been the
result of an intense preference for a Europe-wide initiative on any innocuous subject to promote d6tente, and such shift of preferences as has
subsequently occurred against air pollution may have been an unintended consequence of the regime and its norms.2
Rationalist theorists of inter-state cooperation have been unwilling
to concede a normative effect for law beyond its impact on pursuit of
interests (or preferences) and, perhaps, its interest-shaping or prefer-

19. See Lewis A. Komhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundations of Spontaneous Or-

der?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 670 (1992) (reviewing ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SErrLE DISPUTES (1991)).

20.

See EVGENY M. CHOSSUDOVSKY, "EAsT-WEST" DIPLOMACY FOR ENVIRONMENT IN

THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Sales No. E.88.XV.ST26 (1990) (canvassing history of the for.mation of the LRTAP regime); see also Marc A. Levy, European Acid Rain: The Power of
Tote-Board Diplomacy, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 75, 81 (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993); Marc
A. Levy, Remarks, 89 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

214,216 (1995).
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ence-shaping and belief-shaping effect. The instrumental roles played
by legal rules could also be played (but perhaps not as well) by other
types of norms. Indeed, rationalist theorists of international relations
have not paid much attention to differences in effects between legal
and other norms or between types of legal norms,21 whereas economic
theories of law have distinguished different types of norms primarily
in terms of the costs imposed and benefits conferred."
To most lawyers, analysis of law in these highly instrumentalist
terms fails to capture much of the true impact of law. One of H.L.A.
Hart's most important contributions to positivist legal theory had the
effect of reinforcing the need for care in treating law as a body of
objectively determinable rules. He argued that while objective behavior
is a starting point for demonstrating rules, it alone is insufficient; there
must be an internal aspect, so that legal rules entail patterned behavior
combined with an appropriate internal attitude among relevant actors
involving criticism of oneself and of others for certain violations on the
ground that a rule has been violated.23 This element is essential to the
understanding of norms shared by most lawyers: Chayes and Chayes,
for example, define norms as "prescriptionsfor action in situations of
choice, carrying a sense of obligation, a sense that they ought to be
followed."2'4 Neil MacCormick pushes Hart's analysis further in arguing
that "any account of rules and norms and standards of conduct must be
in terms of this 'internal point of view,'" such that, it must take account
21. See generally INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983); cf.
FRIEDRICH W. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS (1989) (criticizing this theory

of norms). Chayes and Chayes likewise do not draw systematic distinctions between principles, standards, and rules; procedural and substantive norms; formal and informal
authoritative norms; or tacit or background norms. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at
113.
22. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE

DISPUTES (1991); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
23. See HART, supra note 6, at 56-57, 88-117. The importance of an internal aspect has
long been recognized in the study of the nature of legal obligation. In the second half of the

seventeenth century, Samuel Pufendorf articulated a very similar notion in developing his
natural law theory:
Now, altho' there are many other Things which have an Influence on the Will, in
bending towards one side rather than the contrary, yet Obligation hath this peculiar
Force beyond them all, that whereas they only press the Will with a kind of natural
Weight or Load, on the Removal of which it returns of its own Accord to its for-

mer Indifference; Obligation affects the Will in a moral Way, and inspires it
inwardly with such a particular Sense, as compels it to pass Censure itself on its

own Actions, and to judge itself worthy of suffering Evil, if it proceed not according to the Rule prescrib'd.
SAMUEL PUFENDORF,

OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS:

EIGHT BOOKS,

(translated by Basil Kennett, 4th ed., London, Printed for J. Walthoe et al, 1729).
24. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 113.

I.vi.5
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of those who operate with these norms." The internal aspect of norms
can not be achieved merely by the pressure of social sanctions and the
pressure to participate in social sanctions: at least some of the relevant
actors must have a volitional commitment to a particular normconforming pattern of action by preference over other possible actions.
This is the difference between understanding or using norms and being
volitionally committed to them.26
The weight of the internal aspect is manifest in Jon Elster's conclusion "that social norms provide an important kind of motivation for
action that is irreducible to rationality or indeed to any other form of
optimizing mechanism;" 27 in seeking to distinguish social norms from'
rationality, he emphasizes that social norms "have a grip on the mind."
Some socio-psychological studies suggest that individuals are much
more likely to conform their behavior to norms to which they have an
internal volitional commitment, and that such commitments are correlated with perceptions that the relevant rule is fair. Compliance is thus
influenced by perceptions of fairness apart from rational calculations of
costs and benefits. 29 Thomas Franck has sought to explain the compliance-pull of international norms as a function of their perceived
procedural legitimacy?0 Yet, as Robert Keohane has pointed out, it is
difficult to separate compliance-pull from legitimacy so as to posit a
clear causal relation between them, and it is virtually impossible in international relations to measure one without the other.'
If taken seriously, the "internal aspect" of rules is difficult to uncover
by social science methods. 2 Objective observation of the conformity between behavior and a particular rule says little about the impact of the rule
on behavior. Similarly, while observation of the frequency of the imposition of sanctions for deviance from a rule is useful, it says little about
the normative attitude animating the infringer or the sanctioner. Indeed,
25. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 284 (1978).

26. See id. at 288.
27. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 15 (1989).

28. Id. at 100.
29. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
30. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
(1990); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995).
Chayes and Chayes take a similar approach, although they are undecided as to whether substantive justice might also be a requisite for an effective legal system. See CHAYES &
CHAYES, supra note 5, at 133-34.

31. See Robert 0. Keohane, Comment, InternationalRelations and InternationalLaw:
Two Optics 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487, 493 (1997).
32. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF
RATIONALITY (1989); Amartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, 40
ECONOMICA 241 (Aug. 1973); see also THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY (Karen Schweers Cook
and Margaret Levi eds., 1990).
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the infringement of the rule may not itself be an adequate explanation of
the sanctioning behavior, and the sanctions may have little effect on infringing behavior.3 Thus, an approach to compliance that focuses only
on objectively observable patterns of behavior implicitly takes these
patterns as proxies for internal attitudes and other relevant normative
effects. Such proxies may be adequate in some policy situations, but
there is frequently a risk that policy based on the circumscribed view of
norms employed in rationalist instrumentalist theories will be suboptimal or dysfunctional.
C. New "Liberal" Theories of InternationalLaw
The Hobbesian separation of the domestic and the international has
long been challenged on moral and political grounds, and the phenomena of "complex interdependence" and extensive "transnational"
relations have stimulated further interest in other conceptions of international relations. Marxist theories pose one familiar challenge to the
predominant Western accounts, but in response to the perceived spirit of
the times there has been increasing contemporary interest in the articulation of "liberal" theories of international relations. These propose
accounts of international politics that begin with individuals as political
actors. Preferences of individuals are aggregated and mobilized through
political processes. State institutions respond to individuals and groups
in different ways, but do not represent all individuals and groups, even
while they enjoy general competence to regulate.3
While rationalist in methodology, liberal accounts of international
relations and international law point to at least three issues bearing on
compliance that are not captured by standard rationalist theories of inter-state cooperation. First, liberal approaches provide a way into the
very difficult problem for rationalists of fully explaining the behavior of
the State where the State is treated as a single "rational" actor. Actual
behavior may be more completely understood by disaggregating the
State into various relevant components (e.g., the Environment Ministry,
33. Some social psychologists suggest that the likelihood of the imposition of sanctions
is a more important variable than the severity of sanctions. See Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE

WITHOUT GOVERNMENT 160,176-77 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992)
(arguing that the risk of detection and exposure is often just as important, and sometimes
more important, than material sanctions).
34. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States,

6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503-38 (1995) (presenting a "liberal" theory of international law based
upon these tenets). For a critical discussion see Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin
Controversy, The World Trade Organization, and the Liberal Project to Reconceptualize
InternationalLaw, 5 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 1 (1994).
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the Trade Ministry, the Legislature or a Legislative Committee, the
Courts, the Army), and analyzing the actions and interactions of these
components by reference to representative and regulative functions and
to aggregations of individual and group preferences, interests and values
of officials in the specific roles they play. Liberal accounts also open the
way to locate the (disaggregated) State within an increasingly dense
matrix of transnational interactions involving (components of) other
States, inter-governmental institutions, corporations, and a whole range
of cross-border groups and networks that are slowly evolving into a
transnational civil society. It follows that the law relevant to behavior,
and institutional and social activities relating to the making, implementation, enforcement and impact of norms, should be seen to comprise
traditional inter-state law, transnational law, and aspects of national law.
Compliance thus involves conformity with different sets of norms made
by and directed to different sets of actors, rather than the traditional
model of inter-state rules implemented by national measures. Appropriate levels of compliance, and perhaps even the meaning of
"compliance," are outcomes of the political interaction of aggregated
preferences or, in discursive accounts, the weighted claims and responses of the relevant actors in the discursive community.
Finally, proponents of liberal theories argue that regime-type is an
important explanatory variable. Liberals might hypothesize "that the
more adherence to democratic norms, the more implementation and
compliance."35 It is difficult to control for other variables such as bureaucratic capacity, and the causal pathways are bound to be complex
and to point in different directions. Harold Jacobson and Edith Brown
Weiss speculate that while democracies tend to be more transparent and
more open to citizen and NGO influence, the heightened role of public
opinion and open political controversy can also work against compliance. On balance, they suggest that "democratic governments are more
likely to do a better job of implementing and complying with international environmental accords than nondemocratic governments; but this
generalization does not always hold, and democratization does not necessarily lead automatically or quickly to improved compliance. 36

35. Edith Brown Weiss, Remarks, 89 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (1995).
36. Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collective Project, 1
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 119, 142 (1995).
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III. CONSTRUcTIVIST AccouNTs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Constructivist accounts of international relations give central significance to the social construction of identities and meanings among
actors in the international system. Alexander Wendt, for example, has
proposed a constructivist pre-theory which accepts that States are the
principal units of analysis but argues (against realists) that key structures in the state system are intersubjective rather than material, and
(against rationalists) that state identities and interests are in some way
constructed by these intersubjective structures, and are thus in some significant respects endogenous rather than exogenous. 7 He distinguishes
"corporate" from "social" (or "role") identities of States: corporate
identities are composed of "intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that constitute actor individuality," while social identities are "sets of meanings
that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others."3
Social constructs such as norms and authority thus occupy a deeper and
more significant place in the international system than rationalists allow.
An approach to international law that shares much of the intellectual
provenance of constructivism is an account of law not as a body of rules
but as a system of legal relations, at once universalizing from individual
particularities, patterns of interactive behavior, and particularizing society's universal purposes.
Philip Allott's application to international law of such a concept of
law is illustrative. Law is a means of continuous self-constitution for a
society, embodying the society's possibilities, and transforming behavior so that the society becomes what it imagines it could be.39 For Allott,
as for constructivist theorists of international relations generally, norms
have an important constitutive function. The struggle of international
constitutionalism is to establish a higher law, constitutive of international society and of the increasingly important global public realm
(especially the spheres of the Security Council and the European Union
Council, in which legitimacy and legality are seen to be lacking).
A. Constitutive Norms and Discursive Communities
Constructivist accounts of law as constitutive of social relations
treat norms as fundamental not only to behavior but to actor identities
underlying behavior. The intersubjective elaboration of norms, and their
complex role as the embodiment and constitution of social relations,
37. See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the InternationalState, 88
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 384, 384-85 (1994).
38. Id. at 385.
39. See PHILIP ALLOTr, EUNOMIA: A NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 3-8 (1990).
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excludes the types of linear causal relations between norms and behavior that rationalists regard as the central topic for investigation. Most
accounts of compliance presuppose the value of seeking to investigate
such causal relations, while acknowledging the difficulties of such a
project. The constructivist approach points, however, to the particular
problems of conceptualizing "compliance" where norms are constitutive
rather than simply regulative. It highlights the difficulty of extracting
norms from wider structures of social relations. 40 An account of compliance oriented toward relations and identities would be almost
irreconcilably different from rationalist notions of compliance that
dominate the existing literature. Chayes and Chayes, for example, focus
on compliance with norms, but follow the constructivists part of the way
in asserting that the discursive interpretation, elaboration, application,
and enforcement of international rules, accomplished through mostly
verbal interchange, is at the heart of the compliance process.' This discursive or dialogic approach seeks to make discourse material and
causal,42 but is open to the rationalist criticism in that it says little that is
truly material about when such discourse does or does not have an impact on behavior, or about the conditions and boundaries of its
effectiveness .3
B. Participation
Assessing the significance of variance in identity, nature, attributes
and numbers of participants in relevant legal regimes is important to
contemporary work on compliance. One set of issues concerns the State:
Should it be seen as an "actor"? Should it be viewed as unitary or disaggregated? What is the relation between behavior of States and behavior
of other participants in the legal process? Even where the focus is on
States, each of the major theoretical approaches to international law
suggests that variance in participation is relevant to compliance.
Rational-choice models of inter-state cooperation suggest that in the
case of formal agreements the dynamics of compliance (conformity of
behavior with rules) vary according to the number and interestdistributions of actors as well as the distributions of power and preference
intensities; dynamics favoring compliance tend to be better in small-n
.

40. See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social

Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992) (demonstrating a constructivist
treatment of sovereignty).
41. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 118-20.
42. The speech act theory of Jtirgen Habermas is a different theoretical project which

some international relations scholars use to bridge the same gap. See, e.g., NICHOLAS ONUF,
WORLD OF OUR MAKING (1989).
43. See Keohane, supra note 31, at 494.
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agreements. Downs and Rocke model the case of three States (X, Y, and
Z) bordering a common but increasingly polluted lake, where X and Y
have good implementation capacity and good prospects for the maintenance, of that capacity but have doubts as to present capacity and
especially the risk of future diminution in capacity of Z. Where costs of
repeated enforcement against Z may be high, it may be rational for X and
Y to set up a demanding institution in which Z is not a full participant
rather than to set up either a weak or a demanding but costly institution
in which X, Y, and Z are full participants.4
Liberal theory also models a differentiated world, in which cooperation among (disaggregated) liberal states may be higher than
cooperation involving non-liberal states for a variety of reasons relating
to the nature of liberal democracies, including the allegedly greater participation of stakeholders and the ability of liberal states to overcome
time-inconsistency problems in contracting and to establish more trust
and commitment.45
Constructivism adds a quite different dimension, however, in suggesting that the participants are themselves constituted by the norms
and interactions, and that the very identities of participants are in part
endogenous. 4 Empirical work is needed on the constitutive and identity-shaping effects of different accords or sets of norms, especially in
conjunction with the hypothesis that compliance-relevant behavior
changes over time. The weight, systemic centrality, and legitimacy of
sets of norms might be relevant variables, whereas simple distinctions
of legal form (e.g., between binding and non-binding norms) seem
less likely to have direct causal significance.
IV. NON-DIRECTIVE SPONTANEOUS ORDERS AND
INFORMAL SOCIAL NORMS

Isolation of a particular legal rule in order to study compliance with
it leaves open the potentially serious problem of how to take account
both of the normative order which gives the norm its context and
meaning, and of the other legal and non-legal norms which color its
44. See GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? DOMESTIC
UNCERTAINTY AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 105-29 (1995).

45. See Benedict Kingsbury, Whose International Law?: Sovereignty and Non-State
Groups, 88 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1994)
(criticizing descriptive and prescriptive excesses in liberal divisions of the world into
"zones").

46. See generally THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN
WORLD POLITICS (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996).
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operation. This problem may be overcome in particular issue areas
through careful research designs, but in other cases the distortions
involved in studying compliance with a particular norm in isolation are
so great as to cast doubt on the utility of the enterprise.
International lawyers commonly hold a purposive View of international law; a view that is often progressivist and aspirational. This view
is buttressed by the sources image of States interacting in purposive
fashion to agree on the law in particular areas, and by the belief that it is
possible to identify objective technical "problems" (e.g., environmental
degradation) so as to evaluate legal regimes as part of technical
"solutions" to these problems. Studies of correspondence of behavior with
rules are frequently pulled toward assessment of the effectiveness of rules
in relation to particular explicit or presumed purposes. The purposive approach often coincides with a focus on "legal" norms, especially those
adopted in international instruments.4 ' But the purposive approach and the
exclusive focus on legal norms both entail heuristics that are too simple
for complete understanding of much of the international behavior with
which work on compliance is currently concerned.
A methodically constructed order may be evaluated in rational terms
on the basis of the explicit purposes of the order-although a focus on
structural rationality (e.g., Max Weber's criteria for rational
organization of bureaucracy) has often inhibited analysis of the
purposive rationality (e.g., efficiency-maximization) of organizational
forms, especially those whose purpose and structure do not fit Weberian
principles.48 Likewise, a pure spontaneous order such as a perfectly
competitive market can be evaluated in standard rational terms. But the
neat Hayekian dichotomy of spontaneous and constructed orders (e.g.,
the contrast between markets and hierarchies) proves, when applied to
the vast range of hybrid institutional forms that actually exist, to present
polar ideal types rather than an exhaustive classification. 9 The processes
of operation and development of organizations or regimes owe much to
considerations (e.g., ideologies of institutional design, methods of
professional and disciplinary validation) that are not reducible to
47. Views as to what is meant by "legal" norms are spread widely. See, e.g., FRANCK,
THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS, supra note 30, at 27-40 (examining the internationalist strategy of treating international law as obligatory non-law); Prosper Weil,
Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983)
(discussing "soft law").
48. See James S. Coleman, Propertiesof Rational Organizations,in INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATION STUDIES 79-90 (Siegwart Lindenberg & Hein Schreuder
eds., 1993).

49. See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of
Discrete Structural Alternatives, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATION
STUDIES 3, supra note 48.
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express purposive design or to the logic of spontaneous market
exchange. 0 Since many orders are not simply either purposive
constructs or spontaneous orders, defining and analyzing "compliance"
by reference to the simple rationality of purposive or spontaneous orders
involves distortion.
The difficulties of analyzing particular forms as pure constructed or
spontaneous orders may be illustrated by reference to Robert Ellickson's
investigation of the formation of social norms in a "spontaneous order"
developed among cattle ranchers and other residents of Shasta County.5
The order is presumed to emerge in the same way as in a market (i.e., to
be non-directive). However, Ellickson also hypothesizes that the norms
that emerge as to workaday matters (meaning norms on routine matters
where the stakes are not high) will maximize aggregate welfare of the
group in certain circumstances. Recognizing that subjective welfare
cannot be satisfactorily measured in this empirical situation, he calculates welfare in part by objective criteria, apparently allowing a directive
element to creep in to the theory of spontaneous order. In standard economic analysis, preferences or interests are subjective, but Ellickson
moves from individual pursuit of subjective interest to an analysis of
interest-realization using criteria that are wholly or partly objective,
opening scope for the view that the economic approach to norms in
purely non-directive market terms cannot stand on its own."
Meshed with the complex of interactions among different governance
forms and institutional systems are complex interactions between
different types of norms or normative orders. Standard legal theory
attests to the many ways in which relations among legal norms can be
understood. Thus, Ronald Dworkin's account of relations among
principles, rules, and decisions suggests that in hard cases analysis of a
particular rule in isolation from background principles leads to poor
decisions and misses the systemic idea of law. Relations between legal
norms and other (explicitly non-legal) norms raise even more complex
methodological questions for research on "compliance."" The impact on
behavior of legal norms may be difficult to separate from that of other
norms, and different types of norms are frequently interdependent. This
50. JOHN W. MEYER & W. RICHARD ScoTr, ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL

AND RATIONALITY (1992).
51. ELLICKSON, supra note 22. Ellickson does not have international relations in view;
his main hypothesis derives from observation of social practices in a cattle-ranching county
in northern California. He views the social order in Shasta County as rule-based, but in his
terminology it is based largely on norms, and not on law-hence the title of the book.
52. But see Kornhauser, supra note 19, at 656-63 (criticizing Ellickson's methodology).
53. See, e.g., Andrd Nollkaemper, On the Effectiveness of InternationalRules, 27 ACTA
POLITICA 49 (1992).
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problem is more severe where sanctions and formal proceedings are not
seen as primary motivations of behavior, but even where sanctions are
present and provide evidence of a rule, the rule in question is not
necessarily a simple cause of behavior. The reality is that any social
system includes a wide variety of legal and non-legal norms that may
act simultaneously to affect behavior.
Demonstration of the empirical importance of studying formal and
informal norms together has been one of the contributions of the "law
and society" movement. Ellickson's work on the interactions of different
types of norms in Shasta County is a good illustration of the value of
treating formal and informal norms systematically. Building on his empirical study, he proposes an account of rules as components of systems
of social control.' He classifies systems of social control according to
the type of controller. Each generates a particular type of rule and within
each category there are five sub-types of rules: substantive, remedial,
procedural, constitutive, and controller-selecting. Each controller is
generally associated with a particular type of sanction (one controller
may enforce rules developed by another):
(1) First-party control (actor): rules are personal ethics, sanction is self-sanction, system is called self-control;
(2) Second-party control (person acted upon): rules are contracts, sanction is personal self-help, system is called
promisee-enforced contracts;
(3) Third-party control (social forces): rules are norms, sanction
is vicarious self-help (i.e., others come to aid the person
acted upon), system is called informal control;
(4) Third-party control ([non-governmental] organization):
rules are organization rules, sanction is organizationenforcement, system is called organization-control;
(5) Third-party control (government): rules are laws, sanction is
state-enforcement, system is called legal system.5
In any particular empirical situation, rules in each category may exist, but the actual impact on behavior of any one rule is conditioned both
by other rules and by the interacting operations of the relevant systems
of social control. Focusing merely on the relation of behavior to formal
norms islunlikely to provide either a full understanding of the operative
normative environment or satisfactory causal accounts of behavior. This
is a more general case of the specific concerns among international law54. See ELLICKSON, supra note 22, at 123-83.
55. See id. at 130-32.
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yers about focusing on treaties to the exclusion of "soft-law" instruments, or focusing on written formulations to the exclusion of
customary international law (including the law of state responsibility)
and other relevant norms.
V. REGULATORY PROCESS AccouNTs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Process theories of international law address issues of compliance in
numerous ways, many of which are discussed in the literature. There has
been surprisingly little work, however, on the possibilities and problems
of analyzing the regulatory strategies and compliance related operations
of international legal institutions, particularly bodies established to implement regulatory treaties, by reference to theories of regulatory
process.
In their work on regulatory strategies and the operation of regulatory bodies in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, for
example, Ayres and Braithwaite argue that "compliance is most likely
where [a regulatory] agency displays an explicit enforcement pyramid,"56 with coaxing and persuasion the preferred initial strategy
(because it is less expensive and is cooperation-promoting), and a
graduated scale of increasingly punitive measures deployable in response to particular breaches of rules and standards. 7 Regulatory
approaches to enforcement across entire industries should likewise be a
flexible pyramid, with self-regulation ordinarily the preferred method of
enforcement. Escalating the pyramid gives "the state greater capacity to
enforce compliance but at the cost of increasingly inflexible and adversarial regulation.""8 Ayres and Braithwaite recognize the multiplicity of
motivations for behavior, acknowledging that economistic rational-actor
motivations matter but also asserting that altruism, virtue, trust, aggression, and resistance motivate.
Thus, they favor a minimal-sufficiency approach to social control
aimed at internalizing norms rather than offering rewards and
punishments for every behavior. Individuals have multiple selves and
multiple motivations, and "all corporate actors are bundles of
contradictory commitments to values about economic rationality, law
abidingness, and business responsibility. '59 This mixed-motivation
approach converges with a simple Axelrod-type Prisoners Dilemma
game approach in suggesting a regulatory strategy of Tit-for-Tat,
56. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 35.
57. See id. at 35-40 (outlining the pyramidal structure of enforcement).
58. Id. at 38-40.
59. Id. at 19.
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beginning with cooperation, retaliating toughly against a defection, but
meeting subsequent cooperation with forgiveness and a return to
cooperation.
Application of these models to international law involves difficulties. Some international regulatory relations can be expressed in terms
of Prisoners Dilemma and other standard games only with assumptions
that entail gross oversimplifications.o The hazard that a cooperative relationship of regulators and regulated will become one of capture must
be addressed. For example, this obstacle can be dealt with by involving
public interest groups-however problems of power, representativity
and accountability of such groups remain severe in international society.
International institutions generally operate in an environment vastly different from that confronting national regulators-the relationships and
leverage international regulators have with the regulated may be attenuated (although less so in concentrated global industries), and they
ordinarily have difficulty mustering the power or political support to
credibly threaten the level of sanction that makes a "benign big gun"
strategy effective for some national agencies. Nevertheless, the basic
structure of regulatory relationships may be discerned in many areas of
international activity, and regulatory theories provide insight into the
compliance-promoting strategies of certain international institutions.
One example is the development of complex relationships between
regulator and regulated that is an emerging characteristic of the Mont-6
real Protocol system for protection of the stratospheric ozone layer. 1
The non-compliance procedure, contemplated in Article 8 of the Protocol but developed and adopted by subsequent meetings of the parties
and already in operation for five years, centers on the ten-member Implementation Committee.62 The formal powers of this Committee
culminate primarily in the possibility of recommendations to Meetings
of the Parties, but thus far the Committee has included members who
are also influential at Meetings of the Parties, and the Committee has in
fact enjoyed significant authority and competence.
In its early years, the Committee dealt mainly with issues concerning reporting of data, debating general issues and dealing with questions
concerning particular States. Initial data provided important baselines
for assessing compliance with quantitative and timetable requirements.
60. Game theoretic models of particular situations are now vastly more complex than
those detailed by Axelrod. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EvOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984)
The applicability of simple prisoners' dilemma models in many situations is contested, as
Ayres and Braithwaite recognize. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 54-100.
61. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 21 INT'L ENv'T
REP. (BNA) 3151 (May 1993) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].

62. Id. at art. 8.
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The Committee has sought to build cooperative relations by refraining
from challenging data submitted by particular countries where possible
non-conformity with Protocol rules was outweighed by the more fundamental interest in keeping the country moving in the direction
required by the Protocol. 3 Thus, data submitted voluntarily by South
Korea before adhering to the Protocol reportedly indicated that it exceeded the per capita consumption limits of Article 5 (exempting lowuse developing countries from obligations for a ten year period),' but
revised data placing South Korea just under the limit were subsequently
accepted. On data issues, as in its increasing work on issues concerning
phaseout and reduction, the Committee has sought to build trust and
authority among states parties. Aware of major long-term issues once
obligations began to bite in 1996, the Committee prudently refrained
from questioning possible less serious non-compliance by Russia in the
years through 1995. The Committee has also avoided issues concerning
the nature and extent of obligations to contribute to the Multilateral
Fund (MLF), which might lead to a debilitating confrontation with the
United States.
The first formal cases of (imminent) non-compliance referred to the
Committee were submitted in 1995 by five states in respect of their own
problems meeting Protocol obligations.65 The Secretariat played a role in
inducing these states to invoke the non-compliance procedure rather
than simply to seek a blanket five year waiver from the Meeting of the
Parties. The Implementation Committee entered into a dialogue with the
three States with the most serious problems (Bulgaria and Poland may
come into full compliance quite quickly), insisting on improved compliance with data-reporting requirements and moving toward agreement
between regulators and regulated on plans intended to lead to eventual
substantive compliance. This approach was largely endorsed by decisions of the Seventh Meeting of the Parties. The effectiveness of the
Committee was potentially enhanced by the connections between progress in the Committee's dialogues and the availability of funds from the
Global Environment Facility (a GEF representative was close at hand
during key sessions of this dialogue).6 With regard to state eligibility for
63. See David Victor, The Montreal Protocol'sNon-Compliance Procedure:Lessons for
Making Other InternationalEnvironmental Regimes More Effective, in THE OZONE TREATIES
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE BUILDING OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 58
(Winfried Lang ed., 1996) (reviewing the work and strategy of the Committee).
64. Montreal Protocol, supra note 61, art. 5.
65. Belarus, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine.
66. See Victor, supra note 63, at 66 n.14 (discussing conditionality indirectly applied to

Russia by the GEF). The effect of such conditionality is a complicated question; Russia expressed strong antipathy toward some of the Vienna decisions, and failed to meet the
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assistance from the Multilateral Fund, access to the Fund has been made
conditional on supply of baseline data required by the Protocol, and
other links between the MLF and the work of the Implementation
Committee are likely to develop.
In the Montreal Protocol case, "compliance" may be conceptualized
as conformity with rules, but in practice even the narrow "legal" concepts of "compliance" and "non-compliance" are more completely
described in terms of a process involving relevant international institutions, the regulated states, and other states. Theoretically, standard
international law dispute settlement mechanisms (perhaps including
conciliation and other mechanisms referred to in Article 11 of the 1985
Vienna Convention) 7 remain open to parties dissatisfied with breaches
by other parties, but in practice such recourse is likely to be difficult
where the Implementation Committee and the Meeting of the Parties are
dealing with non-conforming conduct. It is arguable that the effective
ratification by the Meeting of the Parties of Russia's non-conforming
conduct might exclude some remedies for breach of the treaty. As to
other potential actors in the regulatory process, public interest groups
(NGOs) have played little role so far in matters dealt with by the Implementation Committee, but industries concerned with ozone-depleting
substances and related products are significant sources of information
and policy advice. These industries can play a considerable role in possible non-compliance situations in providing technical guidance and
technology transfer. Given the significance for particular technologies
and manufacturers of recommendations and preferences formed in
Montreal Protocol institutions, particularly the MLF, lobbying by and on
behalf of industrial interests is a persistent feature of these institutions.
The Montreal Protocol case illustrates the insights that regulatory
models may provide for international law. The complex relations of
status and operation among different components of the system
deadline set at Vienna for provision of more detailed information, thus knowingly putting in
jeopardy its GEF eligibility. See DUNCAN BRACK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
MONTREAL PROTOCOL 103-05 (1996); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Le fonds pour
l'environnement mondial: recherche et conquite de son identiti, 41 ANNUAIRE FRANi;AIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 612 (1995) (discussing the GEF generally); David Fairman, The
Global Environment Facility: Haunted by the Shadow of the Future, in INSTITUTIONS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL AID 55 (Robert 0. Keohane and Marc A. Levy eds., 1996). The World
Bank favors in its project financing a limited conditionality requiring recipients of funds to
be in (or moving toward) compliance with certain international environmental treaties. If the
Bank refers in applying these criteria to findings of non-compliance by the Implementation
Committee, or at least by the Meeting of the Parties, such findings potentially become a
costly sanction.
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatieis, May 23, 1969, art. I1, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331,335.
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exemplify the intricate interactions of different types of norms and
institutional structures. These interactions are not well captured in
standard international legal typologies (e.g., the sharp sources-based
68
distinction often drawn between binding and non-binding norms).

CONCLUSION

"Compliance" with law is an important but elusive concept. The
purpose of this article is to express caution about the possibilities of
elucidating "compliance" through empirical work alone. Standard empirical definitions of compliance-e.g., a reasonable correspondence
between legal rules or decisions and the behavior of those to whom they
are addressed-provide a useful platform for research on some problems. But while good empirical work is needed, it will not in itself
explain either the effects or the causes of international legal rules, nor
will it explicate the normative relations between international law and
considerations of justice or morality. Theoretical work on approaches to
international law and international relations is required in tandem with
empirical work. At least five broad areas of further research may readily
be identified.
First, as shown in this article, the differences of view about the relations of international law to behavior are such that the concept of
"compliance" with international law cannot be taken as shared, but must
be given meaning by reference to a theory (or a set of interlocking theories) of international law. Different theoretical accounts of international
law suggest different meanings of "compliance" and call for different
types of empirical research design. Some of these theoretical accounts
have not yet been adequately worked out, the relations between them are
poorly understood, and their implications for "compliance" have often
been insufficiently specified.
Second, theoretical work is needed to clarify, and to make cognizable within standard international relations theories, the distinctive
features of law and the nature and significance of norms and normative
arguments. While the distinctive association of national law with courts,
sanctions, and formal legal process is much less pronounced in the international legal system, international law functions in ways which are

68. On the nuanced roles of international institutions and the varieties of norms they develop and apply in practice, see Peter H. Sand, Institution-Building to Assist Compliance
with International Environmental Law: Perspectives, 56 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 774 (1996).
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not replicated to the same extent by non-legal international rules.69
These include the connections between international legal rules and national legal systems, the linkages between issues established by
international legal doctrine, the definition and allocation of roles, rights
and responsibilities, modes of legitimization and delegitimization of
particular positions, the validation and invalidation of distinctive forms
of reasoning, a variety of distinctive institutional and dispute settlement
functions, and the influence exercised by the community of international
law practitioners.70
While contemporary international relations theorists are beginning
to open a path to addressing some of these issues through inquiry into
whether and why persuasion works in international relations, this inquiiy is at a relatively early stage. 7' Within the well-developed
rationalist tradition of institutionalism, crucial questions pertaining to
the roles of law and norms, and to compliance, remain open to debate:
Are institutions efficient? What is the balance between "exogenous" and
"endogenous" factors in institutions? How and to what extent do institutions "drive a wedge between power and outcomes? 7' 2 If law is to be
studied as a social phenomenon, it is often necessary to take account of
the dynamic processes in which rules are embedded. Many of these
processes are successfully approximated in rationalist terms by neoliberal institutionalist theory and by organization theory. But several
distinctive normative features of legal rules and process are not easily
reduced to an instrumentalist calculus.73 Within and outside institutionalism, much more work is needed on the emergence, operation, and
6.9. There is a curious disjunction between the general unwillingness of positivist social
science scholars in international relations to draw distinctions of function between legal and

non-legal rules, and the legal positivist project of distinguishing law from non-law. While
positivist social science has undervalued the distinctive functions served by legal rules, the
obverse legal positivist separation of law from non-legal norms has sometimes led interna-

tional lawyers to undervalue important non-legal causes of behavior, and to attribute to law a
purposive design that does not take account of the other normative orders with which law is
intimately bound in each society.
70. See Andrew Hurrell, InternationalSociety and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective
Approach, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49 (Volker Rittberger ed.,

1993) (addressing the differences between national and international law, and the effectiveness of international law); Young, supra note 16, at 184.
71. See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE,. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

(1996). This is an important element of Robert Keohane's ongoing work on contested commitments in U.S. foreign policy. See Robert 0. Keohane, Commitment Incapacity, the
Commitment Paradox, and American Political Institutions, Presented at Conference on International Influences on U.S. Politics (Nov. 1996) (on file with author).
72. Duncan Snidal, Political Economy and InternationalInstitutions, 16 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 121, 127 (1996).
73. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (2d ed. 1990)
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effects of legal and non-legal norms and normative orders. 4 While light
can be shed on some aspects of compliance without close examination
of these normative elements, investigation of many propositions concerning relations of law to behavior depends on developing
methodologies that take normative elements of law fully into account.
Third, positivist social science in general has already contributed a
great deal of useful theory describing and explaining the two-way causal
relations between rules and behavior, but much more remains to be done
in applying this work to the theory and empirical study of international
problems. Much of the literature on international cooperation focuses on
contracting, but there is frequently more to legal commitment than contract. Legal rules are not merely descriptive summaries of past
decisions: they are projections of the past into the present, and must be
analyzed as normative social constructs with this temporal dimension,
rather than simply as bargains which establish focal points or path dependence. Within the realist-rationalist tradition, more theoretical work
is needed also on the effects of international rules as incentives. It is at
the empirical level, however, that the application of many realistrationalist theoretical insights concerning the relations of rules and
behavior remain to be tested.
Taking behavior as the dependent variable, independent variables
might include the likelihood and costs of sanctions for violations of the
rule, subject matter or issue areas covered by the rule, properties of the
rule, and addressees of the rule, while intervening variables might
include the nature and involvement of the relevant national legal
systems, the roles of non-state groups, and the involvement of different
parts of States. Taking rules as the dependent variable, there has been
considerable analysis of power and interest as independent variables,
and of regimes as intervening variables, but it is not established that
these elements account for all significant variance in rules. Nor has
work on specific causal relationships between behavior and rules been
systematically tested against the realist "big picture" proposition that
both are co-determined by power and interest.75 This realist proposition
of co-determination suggests that, provided rules are seriously intended
to relate to behavior, correspondence between behavior and rules ought

74. See, e.g., Norms in Moral and Social Theory, 100 ETHICS 725 (1990) (symposium
issue addressing norms) Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. (May 1996)
(symposium issue addressing norms).
75. The variables mentioned in this paragraph are familiar in the theory of international
cooperation. See, e.g., Marc A. Levy et al., The Study of International Regimes, 1 EUR. J.
INT'L REL. 267, 290-308 (1995).
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routinely to be high, but that where power configurations or interests
change rapidly behavior and rules are likely to become desynchronized.76
Fourth, changes in the agenda of international issues and the means
employed for dealing with them, together with the increased visibility of
non-state actors and international institutions, pose "internal" challenges
for the positivist project of investigating relations of law and behavior as
relations of States. One challenge appears in liberal arguments for analytic disaggregation of the State as a means to enrich standard modes of
explaining and understanding behavior.77 More complications are raised
by the appreciable roles of non-governmental "civil society" actors in
formation, monitoring and implementation of norms, and in the legal
field by efforts to establish duties and responsibilities arising from conduct of non-state actors. The disciplines of international law and
international relations are not oblivious to such phenomena, but both
have much to do in refining understanding of them and incorporating
them credibly and without exaggeration. More radical proposals have
been made to dispense with the State as a principal unit of analysis in
international affairs, in favor of studying the global and local processes
of a globalized economy and a transnational civil society. 7 The autonomy of the State in the face of international military and capital
structures and of connections between transnational and local interests
has long been put in question, and perceptions of growing interdependence or penetration or eclipse of the State have assumed heightened
political salience in some regions, but the State continues in most cases
to be of at least potentially great importance: in contributing to basic
order, in the effective pursuit of social goals, in the provision of some
system of representation, regulation and accountability. The integrated
study of a wide variety of norms and actors is long overdue; but the
fashion for abandoning focus on States is, at best, grossly premature.
Fifth, the positivist social science project continues to face external
challenges of theory and method. The positivist assumption that it is
possible and useful to separate law and behavior, in order to examine the
relations between them, is contested by those for whom the proper focus
is on the continuous intersubjective constitution and reconstitution of
social relations and of the very identities of actors. On these grounds
76. See, e.g.,

ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (1981).

77. See generally Slaughter, supra note 34 (developing an integrated theory of international law and international relations). Cf. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye,
Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39 (1974)
(addressing the growing significance of international organizations in world politics).
78. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?: THE
POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992) (questioning the usefulness of

the concept of sovereignty).
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and others, Kratochwil and Ruggie urged in 1986 that "the common
practice of treating norms as 'variables'-be they independent, dependent, intervening, or otherwise-should be severely curtailed. So too
should be the preoccupation with the 'violation' of norms as the beginning, middle, and end of the compliance story."79 Some post-modernist
positions are abnegations of the possibility of any recognizable social
science research agenda. But two major elements of the external critique
stand usefully alongside the social science tradition, and offer insights
into the nature and process of law that will clarify and enhance the study
of "compliance" with law.
First, constructivism is beginning to move from epistemological and
ontological theory to the applied study of law and normative systems as
social and institutional constructs, producing tangible analyses of specific problems that can be scrutinized and tested against other accounts.
Second, there is a special salience for the study of law and compliance
in the standard critical charge that a preoccupation with analytic description is a form of construction of reality, and has diverted the
academy from the essential project of ethical evaluation, normative
criticism and prescriptive social construction. Not only is law a normative system, but immanent in legal thought are notions such as justice
and responsibility that provide at least one element of a structure of
normative evaluation. The study of compliance with international law
entails engaging with a normative system and with the ideas of law
which render it a critical-constructive and ethical practice. Such engagement is not standard in contemporary international relations theory,
and holds the promise that the serious study of compliance with international law may prove to be as valuable for international relations as it
undoubtedly will for the development of the field of international law.

79. Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, InternationalOrganization:A State of
the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753, 768 (1986).

